## 1NC

### Off

**We’ll begin with a story from Meinzerin, Kuhn, and Klausmann in 1997**

(Marion Meinzerin, professor of history at Cambridge University, Gabriel Kuhn, Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Innsbruck, Ulrike Klausman, freelance journalist, “Woman Pirates and the politics of the Jolly Roger”, Pg 18-22, *azp*)

**Medusa is the Gorgon’s head threatening to emerge from the sea. This terrible monster was once a beautiful woman who was raped in a temple of Athena by the sea god Poseidon.** According to Ovid, **Athena was so enraged that she turned Medusa into an ugly creature, transforming her hair into a thousand snakes**. After that **Medusa was so ugly that any man who caught sight of her would turn to stone**. Very much in keeping with modern»day court procedures in cases of rape, **Athena let the rapist go unpunished**. Why was **Athena** so hostile to women? Actually she **was a very ancient wise goddess, of far older origin than the male Hellenic gods.** But **after the arrival of male gods to the mythology, she was transformed into a being birthed from Zeus’s** head, who had swallowed her mother Metis, the Goddess of Wisdom, who was pregnant with Athena by parthenogenesis. Afterwards, **Athena became the protective goddess of many a hero. One of them was Perseus the Destroyer. He was sent to kill Medusa. Athena gave him a perfectly reﬂective bronze shield, so that he could see Medusa without looking at her**. Thanks to this device, **Perseus was able to behead Medusa, with Athena guiding his hand. He stuck Medusa’s head in a sack and gave it as a gift to Athena, who thereafter carried the snakes on her breastplate so as to strike fear into her enemies**. The symbol of the snake always belonged to Athena, whose mother Metis was called “the wise counsel.” In prehistoric times the snake was a symbol of feminine wisdom, and not just of growth and fertility, as was later assumed. Metis and Medusa represent one and the same power. The name Medusa, a feminine form of medon (ruler), derives from the Sanskrit root medha (wisdom), which is also the root for the Greek metis (good counsel). **The grimace of the grey-skinned snake’s head expresses the fury of those women who still remember**. The Latin word for causing someone to think of something, to remind or to warn, is monere. Etymologically a “monster” is thus the “emblem of the gods in terrifying manifestation.” The monster Medusa reﬂects countless obsessive ideas about sea monsters. In mythological terms, **the Medusa story relates the destruction of female culture**; in psychoanalytic terms it describes the hero’s murder of his mother, and femininity as a psycho-symbolic monstrosity? In the end **Perseus failed to achieve his goal, despite divine** protection and all manner of magical assistance, and although he killed his enemy in her sleep with his hand guided by Athena. **Medusa lives on, the Gorgon’s head has grown back, and its fury has by no means burnt out**. The terror of men before Gorgo, who pulls ships into the depths by their bowsprit in the midst of a tempest, is fully justiﬁed. **Gorgo is the Greek name not only for Medusa—petriﬁed through “ugliness”—but also for the mermaids, who are known to be beautiful and lovely. This may seem like a paradox, but corresponds to the ambivalence with which men view the female**. Aristotle’s hostility to women is far more consistent, and serves to clarify the connection. The relationship between femininity, ﬁsh, mermaids, and sea monsters lies in the attributes “wet” and “cold.” These beings all have a shortage of “heat,” and are thus also lacking in soul and reason. According to Aristotle, a mother only provides the passive material, while the father contributes the active soul endowed with reason. He bears the true species of humans (man). If a mother nonetheless brings a female being to the world, she has circumvented the reasoning species, and once again set loose upon the world a monster lacking in soul. In the legends of seafarers, mermaids also have no souls—but might be able to occasionally acquire one by adopting a respectable way of life among people, and falling in love with a man. Patriarchal **stories of dragon-slaying show two different images of the female: the powerful, threatening mother in the form of the monster, and the desirable, submissive virgin**. In the killing of the dragon, psychoanalysts like C.G. lung and Erich Neumann saw the liberation of **the man from his terrible mother, and the conquest of a new image of the female in the form of the lovely virgin. The man becomes a hero by freeing the virgin from the claws of the mighty monster, in order to subordinate her to himself**. In his book on the origins of consciousness, Erich Neumann writes: “the transformation of the male that occurs in the course of battling the dragon includes a change in his relationship to the female, symbolised in the liberation of the hostage from the power of the dragon; meaning a dissolution of the image of the female from that of the terrible mother.“ Neumann ignores that in antiquity, the life-giving femininity of the Earth and the cosmos was worshipped in the form of the Great Mother. In all her monstrosity she threatens the male need for recognition. That which psychologists understand as the liberation of man from the overwhelming power of mother is actually a desire in the collective male consciousness to subdue nature itself. **The story of** our hero **Perseus goes on to show how pointless these acts of violence actually are. Flying high on the trip home after his “glorious” beheading of Medusa, Perseus encounters a beautiful, naked virgin chained to a cliff. On the horizon a sea monster approaches**. The unhappy girl is the daughter of an Ethiopian queen, who had boasted that she and her daughter were as beautiful as the Nereids. The Nereids promptly lodged a complaint with Poseidon, who sent out a ﬂood of storms and a female sea monster in retribution. An oracle declared that the queen’s daughter had to be chained to the cliffs. **Perseus, a man of action, did not dilly-dally**. After quickly negotiating the dowry with the parents of the princess, **he killed the monster in a bloody battle, and “as prize and cause of all the trouble the virgin strides up, released from her chains**,” according to Ovid. Here **Perseus seems to have won the battle of his life, acquiring a kingdom and a lovely princess.** But closer observation shows that the action has gone subtly awry. **The lovely and passive princess is called Andromeda**: andro-mcda, meaning **the “ruler of men.” The information that her mother is an Ethiopian suggests a likely relationship to the Libyan Medusa**. **Apparently the beautiful virgin and her monstrous mother relate one and the same femininity**. Leviathan poses the biblical counterpart to the Greek myth of Medusa. He is a sea serpent, appearing in the legends of sea travellers as the worst of all sea monsters, crushing ships and swallowing seafarers.

**The affirmative’s view of the Other is that of Perseus’s perception of women – the Other is dangerous yet alluring – something to be mapped yet radically unknowable – something to be defeated yet something to be won – a role of the ballot calling for the liberation of the oppressed is symptomatic of the masculine heroism Perseus is engrained in – the ballot becomes a symbol of the prize of Otherness while ontologically erasing the subaltern – the affirmative’s distancing of themselves from those they invoke is like Perseus’s shield – they view the subaltern through a kaleidoscopic lens while sitting comfortably in this air conditioned simulacra we call the debate round – this knowledge production is not just useless neutrality but rather the lynchpin of the Western intellectual subject – any argument the affirmative makes about how the subaltern would totally be on-board with their project relies on the same logic that reinforces conceptions of the inferior Other – a ballot for the affirmative is giving the subaltern a cordectomy**

**Spivak 88** (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,* 1988“Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, *azp*)

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁ- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

**Isn’t it off-putting that the affirmative merely expresses solidarity with the oppressed yet does little to nothing to actually relieve their oppression? – What do you think their endless theories, intellectual movements, and speech acts actually DO to resolve anything? – the answer is absolutely nothing – they aren’t subversive, nor radical, nor even that interesting – their speech act is an intellectual façade designed to avoid having to resolve oppression**

**Raskin 99** (Marcus Raskin, Professor of Public Policy at George Washington University, 1999, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall)

As I have noted, world social categories and knowledge systems have changed so that they now see the colonized as human beings. The shifting in social categories, often by those who are the radicals and liberals of the privileged groups, created deep divisions between reality and its description. But this has not necessarily resulted in fundamental affirmative change. For those who were consigned to the role of slave, serf and oppressed by imperial Western nations, it may be disconcerting, but pleasantly surprising, that some leading international lawyers and intellectuals stand with those movements that take their strength from the dispossessed, wretched and exploited, whether in war or peace. Even though these idealists are educated in Western and imperial categories of social reality, they have, nonetheless, taken as their task the reconstruction and transformation of international law as it is understood in the United States. The skeptical are permitted their doubts, however. After all, what can those who represent the pain of others, and only indirectly their own, do to ameliorate the pain of misery sanctioned by imperial law? **What do such a band of idealists dare to teach to those who suffer, especially when that suffering is often caused, directly or indirectly, by the choices made by the very class of which these Western intellectuals and lawyers are members?** Why should the oppressed listen to those educated in a language and thought-pattern which, beneath the honeyed words, are the egocentric and ethnocentric doctrines of the [\*524] dominator? Certainly until decolonization, the abstract meaning of the words were employed as signifiers and killers of the culturally oppressed. The language of description and the mode of argument, the very words themselves, were instruments of the colonizer. Their very rules, laws, precedents and citations acted as a steel-belted noose to stifle the cries of the wretched. And yet, these were the very lessons the colonized needed to learn in order to stand up to the colonizer and survive. Not only did they survive, they pressed on to reform nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial law using the UN, and the International Court of Justice. Most importantly, they effected the consciousness of nations. Nevertheless, the wretched must wonder why, behind claims of universality and universal human rights, our actions and thoughts have an often indeterminate or contradictory effect. For Americans, the reason is a complex one. Americans seek identification with the victim in their dreams, but the reality for the American political and legal class is somewhere between carelessness and negligence of the oppressed worker, toleration for the destruction of other people's cultures for purposes of extraction and commodification, exploiter of their lands, and executioner in counter-revolutions which rain bombs of state and financial terror around the world. So even when some in the United States stand with the victim, they must always wonder, "Who are we that come forward with our notions that speak of human affirmation? Who are we to tell the colonized when independence is a drag on themselves and on others as well, possibly leading to war and internecine conflict?" And the wretched can go further and say, "You have recognized our struggle, taken away our language and substituted your words of understanding, but **now what?** How is freedom to be sustained? We, the formerly marginalized, the indigenous and the merely wretched, have come to recognize that what is presented by the West to humanity as conventional knowledge is a betrayal." In truth, **it was a betrayal by intellectuals and all those who dared to suggest that the twentieth century could be a time of liberation and freedom**. **Education and knowledge as mediated through the colonizer's strainer has left humanity in worse shape than at the beginning of the twentieth century**. For some, the god that really failed them was education/knowledge, which, through its institutions, set itself up as the emancipator. This failure, this sense of futility where knowledge is an instrument of domination for the few, demands recognition.

**The ballot is a moment of interest convergence between the Affirmative and the judge – This rhetorical alliance with alterity is a technology of political demand that repeats the strategic attitude of the system it seeks to overturn – The guilty solidarity of the 1AC masks the privilege that prevents the AFF project from directly changing the lives of the people they invoke to warrant a ballot.**

**Chow** – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - **1993**

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 16-17)

Why are "tactics" useful at this moment? As discussions about "multiculturalism,' "interdisciplinarity," "the third world intellectual," and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the "otherness” ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new "solidarities" whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities arc often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their "victimization" by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate from their "oppositional" viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that "if a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, ... he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen."28 Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is "without any base where it could stockpile its winnings" (de Certeau, p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

**It is also a form of self-subalternization, where the judges are encouraged to found a vacuous solidarity with the Affirmative Other by valorizing the material deprivation portrayed in the 1AC – However, their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.**

**Chow** – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - **1993**

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 10-11)

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

**The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust**

**Chow 93** (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

**This knowledge production is merely an attempt to map out the coordinates of alterity for the targeting computers of our death machines**

**Chow 06** (Rey Chow, Humanities and Modern Culture & Media Studies at Brown University, 2006 The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, 40-1)

Often under the modest apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign “self”/”eye”—the “I”—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by “the absence of a definable object”—and by “the problem of the vanishing object.”

**The alternative is the judge should vote negative to engage in academic exile – rather than examining structures external to this round, we should question our privilege to speak in the first place – our rejection of the academy is a precondition for any semblance of solvency**

**Biswas, 7** (Shampa BISWAS, Politics @ Whitman, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium 36)

Said has written extensively and poignantly about his own exilic conditions as a Palestinian schooled in the Western literary canon and living in the heart of US empire.27 But more importantly, he has also articulated exile as a ‘style of thought and habitation’ which makes possible certain kinds of ontological and epistemological openings. Speaking of exile as a ‘metaphorical condition’,28 Said describes it as ‘the state of never being fully adjusted’, of ‘always feeling outside’, of ‘restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’, of ‘a kind of curmudgeonly disagreeableness’. Exile, he says, ‘is the condition that characterizes the intellectual as someone who is a marginal figure outside the comforts of privilege, power, being-at-homeness’.29 Not just ‘foreigners’ but ‘lifelong members of a society’, can be such ‘outsiders’, so that ‘(e)ven if one is not an actual immigrant or expatriate, it is still possible to think as one, to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers, and always to move away from the centralizing authorities towards the margins, where you see things that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and comfortable’.30 What Said privileges here is an intellectual orientation, rather than any identarian claims to knowledge; there is much to learn in that for IR scholars. In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans.31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination.32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts.33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad.34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own.35 It is fair to say that the jostling and unsettling of the nation-state that critical International Relations scholars have contributed to has still done little to dislodge the centrality of the nation-state in much of International Relations and Foreign Policy analyses. Raising questions about the state-centricity of intellectual works becomes even more urgent in the contemporary context in which the hyperpatriotic surge following the events of 11 September 2001 has made considerable inroads into the US academy. The attempt to make the academy a place for the renewal of the nation-state project is troubling in itself; for IR scholars in the US, such attempts can only limit the reach of a global sensibility precisely at a time when such globality is even more urgently needed. Said warns against the inward pull of patriotism in times of emergency and crisis, and argues that even for an intellectual who speaks for a particular cause, the task is to ‘universalize the crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the sufferings of others’.36 He is adamant that this is the case even for beleaguered groups such as the Palestinians whose very survival is dependent on formulating their demands in a nationalist idiom.37 American intellectuals, as members of a superpower with enormous global reach and where dissension in the public realm is noticeably absent, carry special responsibility in this regard.38 What the exilic orientation makes possible is this ability to universalise by enabling first, ‘a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’ so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences ‘one gets a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’,39 and second, an ability to see things ‘not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way’, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable.40 The second of these abilities displaces the ontological givenness of the nation-state in the study of global politics; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’.41 The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context. The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his.

### Off

**Text: We affirm the entirety of the 1ac sans the plan text.**

**It’s net beneficial – it solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to.**

**It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives.**

**There is no internal link between the plan text and the solvency.**

**Schlag, 90** (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

In fact, **normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it.** For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? **Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics** and perhaps a few law students -- **persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.**

**The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over the rough edges of the world with warm and fuzzy normative legal talk, emotionally disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act**

**Delgado, 91** (richard delgado , colorado law professor, 139 pa. L. Rev. 933, april)

But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? **Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners?** Pierre **Schlag,** for example, **has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all** [\*954] **form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself.** n82 **This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.** 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that **intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition.** n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. **Normativity** thus **enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us.** In the legal system, the clearest [\*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.

**They are more interested in playing hermeneutic games than engaging in politics, the preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of legal praxis.**

**Schlag, 90** (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this **normative legal thought**, as Robert Cover explained, **takes place in a field of pain and death**. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, **normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death.** **To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death**. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. **What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have** (or do not have) **to the field of pain and death.** And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [\*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that **normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death.** n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that **the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene.** n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, **it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices** -- academic and otherwise.

### Solvency

Latin America will never adopt renewables – fossil fuels are too economically viable and oil lobby.

Meisen and Krumpel, 9– President of the Global Energy Network Institute / Research-Associate at GENI (Peter and Sebastian, “Renewable Energy Potential of Latin America”, December 2009; < http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-potential-of-latin-america/Potential%20of%20Renewables%20in%20Latin%20America-edited-12-16%20\_Letter\_.pdf>)//Beddow

In reality the situation of renewable energies in Latin America is not as positive or optimistic as we might want to think, or as certain statistical data lead us to believe. There are many problems associated with the implementation of renewables as well as their impact on the environment and society. In this context, the main problem for renewable energies in Latin America is in the way energy and development policies have been constructed. In most cases, energy policies and strategies in Latin America have excluded renewables and other alternatives as being too costly and technologically unfeasible, or by arguing that the country does not have the capabilities to implement them. The easiest explanation for this, and one which is usually mentioned, is the lack of incentive and foresight. Since the region has an abundance of resources such as oil, gas, and hydro, it is in general easier, cheaper and more technically feasible to keep exploiting conventional energy resources than to in vest in renewable energies or create appropriate renewable energy policies. Another common explanation is that the development of renewable energies clash wi th the interest of powerful players, particularly large energy companies, and, therefore, there are few incentives to promote them.

Decentralization exacerbates neoliberalism – makes private companies responsible for providing welfare which IS LITERALLY the same neoliberal ideology they critique

#### Renewable assistance to Mexico pads corporate coffers, while robbing the inhabitants of their land

Pasqualetti 11 (Martin J. Pasqualetti, Senior Sustainability Scientist, Global Institute of Sustainabillity, 5/25/2011, “Social Barriers to Renewable Energy Landscapes”, Wiley Online Library | JJ) GENDER MODIFIED BECAUSE JJ DOESN’T KNOW WHAT PRONOUNS ARE

\*Oaxaca – wa-ha-kah

The ultimate scale of development will rely on several factors other than raw wind strength and consistency. Much will depend on siting choices and cooperation between developers and local residents. Current plans are to concentrate the wind farms near the rural communities of La Venta and La Ventosa, northeast of Juchitán (Stevenson 2009). This could be a portentous choice. Founded in 1486, Juchitán is now home to about 75,000 citizens, mostly Zapotecs and Huaves. It is also the seat of the Coalición Obrera, Campesina, Estudiantil del Istmo, an inﬂuential popular movement that matured in the 1970s combining socialists, peasants, students, and indigenous groups (COCEI 2010). The relative ease of passage through the low-lying region of the isthmus has contributed to its strategic value and the long history of occupation in Juchitán. Such long occupation has helped create a close association between the people and their land (O’Connor and Kroefges 2008), as well as substantial autonomy from the central government in Mexico City. The autonomy is reﬂected in the history of political unrest and activism common in this region. A revolt took place in 1834, and life was again interrupted by the Mexican-American War in 1847. Less than twenty years on, the people of Juchitán defeated the French. Porﬁrio Díaz, later a dictator of Mexico, populated his army mostly with citizens from Juchitán. In 1910 other natives of the town organized in support of the revolutionaries Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. By 1980 Juchitán had attracted further attention by electing a left-wing, prosocialist municipal government, the ﬁrst Mexican community to do so in the twentieth century. In February 2001 Juchitán received the military caravan of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional. Many residents in the region clearly have an anarchist bent. Given this historical and cultural background, it is not surprising that the changes which accompany the introduction of wind power have met with some resistance. In recent years the tendency for citizen activism has evolved into increasingly common clashes, ones that pit locals against the federal government over plans to alter their sense of landscape permanence by installing wind megaprojects in the area. Among the contentions is that local residents are receiving meager compensation for leasing land to the wind developers.2 The reported amount has ranged from amounts equivalent to U.S. $51 per acre per year for a single turbine to U.S. $40–$48 per acre per year (Sanchez 2007; Hawley 2009). Others have reported the rate to be as low as U.S. $15 per year for 7.4 acres, as Karen Trejo reported in 2008: Faustina López Martínez, originally from the village of Juchitán, complained that the companies promised agriculture aid without ever following through. On the lands where she used to plant corn to sell, the Spanish company Union FENOSA plans to install windmills to generate wind energy for the next 30 years, and possibly extending to double the term. In exchange, López will receive 150 pesos (less than US $15) each year for the rent of each of her 3 hectares (7.4 acres) of land. Such disproportion is one of the principal reasons behind the formation of organizations such as the Grupo Solidario de la Venta, which are opposed to wind development in the isthmus (Girón-Carrasco 2007). This and other groups claim that the “government has been violating the rights of indigenous peoples, causing both environmental and cultural destruction; that the intent of . . . wind park construction is to turn the isthmus into an industrial corridor” (Sanchez 2007). These strong antiwind sentiments are being noticed in other wind-rich countries, including the Netherlands: “In Juchitán, in southern Mexico, the wind always blows. Very hard. Wind farms are springing up like mushrooms . . . to the great displeasure of the local Zapotec farmers. . . . Wind power projects on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in southeastern Mexico harm land of Zapotecan farmers” (La Ruta). As in Massachusetts and Scotland, politics are playing an important and continuing role in Oaxaca. Developers, politicians, and officials of various government agencies in Mexico City have been peppered with questions of propriety, fairness, inﬂuence, and control. The public advocacy organization National Wind Watch oﬀers this explanation: “The growing resistance to wind farm construction in southern Oaxaca . . . is based on local landowners’ negative negotiating experiences with the CFE [the national electricity company], discomfort with the broad freedoms seemingly granted to multinational corporations and an increasing concern about the possible environmental consequences of the wind farms themselves” (Sanchez 2007,). “Are the ejidatarios being victimized?” asked a reporter from USA Today, at a public presentation at the Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City in June 2009 (Hawley 2009).3 A local leftist farm group known as the Asamblea en Defensa de la Tierra y el Territorio has complained about the treatment it has been receiving, saying: “They promise progress and jobs, and talk about millions in investment in clean energy from the winds that blow through our region, but the investments will only beneﬁt business~~men~~ [people], all the technology will be imported . . . and the power won’t be for local inhabitants” (Stevenson 2009). The group is calling on supporters to defend the land “inherited from our ancestors.” They have said “no to the wind energy megaproject in the isthmus that desecrates our lands and cultural heritage” (Sanchez 2007). Protestors have taken to the streets, and incidents of rock throwing, accompanied by minor injuries, have occurred. In addition, some groups have barricaded roads leading to wind sites; others have marched, holding antiwind banners (Figure 12). Most of the protests are over the loss of land: “The Greedy Grabbers need land, and lots of it, to be able to put up sticks and blades and thus seize and put a meter between the people and heaven itself” (Giordano 2006).

#### **The impossibility of the gift necessitates a violent conception of debt that reinforces the economy logic of calculability – turns the case**

Trussel, 9 (Taylor Trussel – PhD candidate in Philosophy at Villanova University, January 2009, “The Gift of Power: Foucault, Derrida, and Normalization”, http://gradworks.umi.com/3352258.pdf) //MD

Here, then, for Derrida, is the fundamental paradox of the gift: to truly give a gift, ¶ there must be no debt or obligation or return whatsoever; but any gift—no matter how ¶ much we genuinely wish to give freely—obligates the other to give in return. ¶ For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, ¶ countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to give ¶ me back what I gave him or her, there will not have been a gift, whether ¶ this restitution is immediate or whether it is programmed by a complex ¶ calculation of long-term deferral or differance (GT, 12). ¶ ¶ Reciprocity produces an economic relationship, which nullifies the original gift. The gift ¶ can have nothing to do with exchange, but the gift—counter-gift dynamic is precisely ¶ that. In the end, my gift to you costs me nothing because I get something of equal value ¶ in return. When I give my gift, I essentially buy your gratitude or your counter-gift or ¶ your indebtedness. I have given nothing. The image of two people giving each other the ¶ same DVD for Christmas illustrates just how exchange nullifies the gift: nothing has been ¶ given because nothing has been lost; parity is restored instantly. The relationships Mauss ¶ examines are, therefore, not gift relationships. Instead, they are essentially exchanges of ¶ goods, and any such exchange creates an economy. As Derrida shows, an economy is the antithesis of a gift. “Economy,” oikonomia, ¶ consists of two elements: the oikos, the hearth or the home; and nomos, the law, “the law of distribution (nemein), the law of sharing or partition, the law as partition (moira), the ¶ given or assigned part, participation” (GT, 6). As the law of the hearth, economy relates ¶ to management of scarce resources. Economic thinking aims to ensure that nothing is ¶ wasted and that expenses equal income. Any economy is directed with an eye toward a ¶ return on investment that is at last equal to the resources that have been expended, if not ¶ more. Within this restricted economic framework is the broader logic of lack and ¶ demand: resources are limited and must therefore be utilized in an efficient and effective ¶ manner; utility must be maximized. The figure of the economy is the circle: resources go ¶ out and resources come in. It is the nature of an economy to seek closure. Sooner or ¶ later, the books must balance, and all debits and credits must equal zero. The circle must ¶ be complete; the system must find equilibrium. Such is the operative logic of quid pro ¶ quo. We pay out with one hand while receiving with the other, which is precisely what is ¶ wrong with the image of giving proffered by Mauss: whether it is gifts exchanged around ¶ the Christmas tree or the movement of goods through the Kula Ring, giving as Mauss ¶ perceives it always requires giving back.

## 2NC

## OV

#### Their failure to recognize privilege as speaking subjects takes out any solvency and means there’s only a risk of a link.

Chow 93 (Rey Chow, professor of English and comparative literature and director of the comparative literature program at the University of California, Writing Diaspora: tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, p. 118-9)

For "third world" intellectuals, the lures of diaspora consist in this masked hegemony. As in the case of what I call masculinist positions in the China field, their resort to "minority discourse," including the discourse of class and gender struggles, veils their own fatherhood over the "ethnics" at home even while it continues to legitimize them as "ethnics" and "minorities" in the West. In their hands, minority discourse and class struggle, especially when they take the name of another nation, another culture, another sex, or another body, turn into signifiers whose major function is that of discursive exchange for the intellectuals' self-profit. Like "the people," "real people," "the populace," "the peasants," "the poor," "the homeless," and all such names, these signifiers work insofar as they gesture toward another place (the lack in discourse-construction) that is "authentic" but that cannot be admitted into the circuit of exchange. . What happens eventually is that this "third world" that is produced, circulated, and purchased by "third world" intellectuals in the cosmopolitan diasporic space will be exported "back home" in the form of values—intangible goods—in such a way as to obstruct the development of the native industry. To be sure, one can perhaps no longer even speak of a "native industry" as such in the multinational corporate postmodernity, but it remains for these intellectuals to face up to their truthful relation to those "objects of study" behind which they can easily hide— as voyeurs, as "fellow victims," and as self-appointed custodians. Hence the necessity to read and write against the lures of diaspora: Any attempt to deal with "women" or the "oppressed classes" in the "third world" that does not at the same time come to terms with the historical conditions of its own articulation is bound to \* repeat the exploitativeness that used to and still characterizes most "exchanges" between "West" and "East." Such attempts will also be expediently assimilated within the plenitude of the hegemonic establishment, with all the rewards that that entails. No one can do without some such rewards. What one can do without is the illusion that, through privileged speech, one is helping to save the wretched of the earth.

## A2: Perm

#### They cannot stray from their 1ac performance – the choice to exclude certain discussions is not value neutral but a consequence of narrative framing – the 1ac is a static artifact and their attempt to escape that initial framing is in itself a form of violence

Kappeler 95 (Susanne Kappeler, Associate Prof @ Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, 1995, pg. 69-71)

The choice of formulation is political; it is an expression of one’s political attitude. Not only does it reveal how the subject con­stitutes itself — whom it chooses to address and to constitute as the ‘we’ of its discourse, and whom and what it chooses to make an object of speech. It also shows what the subject considers to be the ‘whole’ of the speech or action context and what it chooses to exclude from it. That is, it reveals the subject’s communicative intention. If we lock others into the status of ‘the others’, for example, it is a sign that we do not wish to enter into communication and dialogue with them. Allocating ‘them’ the status of the ‘other’, ‘we’ are speak­ing to ‘ourselves’. As androcentric discourse is speech from men to men and about women, and Eurocentric discourse is speech among Europeans at the ‘centre’ of the world and about those at the ‘pen­phery’, so a white—women—centric discourse is a white women s soliloquy, power speaking to itself. Its addressees are ‘white women —not other white women addressed as communicants in a dialogue, but ‘white women’ as the plural of the white woman subject — we as the plural of myself, talking about ‘them’. It also means that, while we acutely object to being objectified through men’s sexist discourse, considering it to be a form of violence, we do not apparently consider it an act of violence if we ourselves objectify other women — all the less so if those women are absent from the specific speech context. That is to say, we do not consider those we objectify and speak about to be a relevant part of the speech and action context, nor do we consider our act of objectifying them to have any consequences for them worth thinking about. A ‘kind’ interpretation of this discursive behaviour would see it as a result of patriarchal socialization — acquired from dominant discourse as we acquired our ‘mother tongue’ from the speech of our mothers, so that we have unconsciously internalized racism, sexism, classism and scientificness, which now trap and implicate us in our own speech. It is an explanation which, just as Alice Walker criticizes, starts from the assumption of women’s weakness and damagedness, appeal­ing for indulgence on account of diminished responsibility. It is an explanation which also has its respectable model in the ‘high’ theory of semiology, which as Deborah Cameron points out ‘sees experience and indeed the individual herself, as a product and function of an institutionalised system of signs’, where language ‘defines our possi­bilities and limitations, [and] constitutes our subjectivities’.’ As an explanation of limitations and their causes, it is closer to excusing incapability and inadequacy than to positing them as a problem to be overcome. As feminists or Walker’s womanists, however, we will start from the assumption of women’s traditional competence and ability and attribute responsibility to ourselves. For our aim is less to describe these symptoms in the interest of a precise diagnosis and aetiology of our speech impediments, than to analyse the power of discourse and the abuse of this power, in the interest of overcoming them. Nothing prevents us from questioning language use, least of all our own, from asking who we are speaking to when we say ‘we’, who is meant and who is not, and whether what we say applies to this group; when we say ‘women’, from asking ‘all women, or which women?’, and when we describe facts, whether they are as we say, and if we are in a position to judge them. Nothing stops us asking about the acting subjects which have disappeared from passive and adjectival construc­tions representing actions, or from statements concerning perceptions, by whom ‘excluded’, by whom ‘oppressed’, to whom ‘invisible’, and so forth. That is, nothing stops us from attempting to render concrete again what has linguistically been abstracted. For here we can take a first step towards changing political reality, analysing the contexts of action and naming the agents. Only when we recognize the connec­tions and know those responsible for action can we begin to intervene in political reality and to know where to put up resistance. All the more so if the actions concerned are our own which we have thus tried to withdraw from (our) view. If we nevertheless fail to do so, if we continue to treat communic­ative and discursive behaviour as if they were a natural and individual attribute of ourselves like, say, the colour of our hair, it must be political intention. If we are unwilling to question our use of language and to analyse the power relations in our linguistic behaviour, it betrays our willingness to use the relative power of educational and academic privilege and to abuse it in our own interest. To the extent that our language conforms to the structures of dominant discourse —in particular, its abstraction which conceals the substantial connections and relations of reality — it betrays an intention conforming to the meaning and function of that discourse: to legitimate and maintain power and the distribution of power in society.

## A2: Framework

#### Your role as a judge is to interrogate how we should deal with our privileged positions which allow us to speak in the first place.

Chow 1993

/Rey, Professor Comparative Lit at Brown, “Writing Diaspora” p 15-17 google books/

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

## 2 - Militarization of Intellectualization

**This knowledge production is merely an attempt to map out the coordinates of alterity for the targeting computers of our death machines**

**Chow 06** (Rey Chow, Humanities and Modern Culture & Media Studies at Brown University, 2006 The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, 40-1)

Often under the modest apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign “self”/”eye”—the “I”—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by “the absence of a definable object”—and by “the problem of the vanishing object.”

## 1NR

## PIC

### Overview

**The CP solves best – criticizing their normative form opens up a space for reflection where true solvency becomes impossible.**

**Winter 91** (Steven L. June, Prof of Law @ U. of Miami, Texas Law Review ”On Building Houses”)

As this last argument suggests, **the focus on the complex, systemic nature of affairs need condemn us neither to stasis nor to undecidability**. Rather, the insight that cultural forms both constrain and enable subjectivity provides an alternative way of thinking about the problems of law and social structure. If, as some suggest, "[c]ritique is all there is," n63 then we hazard the kind of political quandary so poignantly illustrated by the legal decisions examined by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic: no matter how eloquent the appeal to an alternative vision**, there remains the quite substantial risk that decision makers will evaluate those dissenting** **arguments or counter-narratives unreflectively** -- that is, through the prism of the dominant cultural assumptions and beliefs that make them who they are -- **and, thus, will be disabled from appreciating, let alone adopting, the perspective that is being offered**. n64 **In contrast**, the essays in this symposium offer a way of moving beyond mere critique to explore instead the role of cultural, cognitive, and socio-linguistic form in channelling, structuring, and configuring practice. We propose to investigate the concrete ways in which, both in the realm of thought and of action, animating form can and does have a distinctive politics. n65 This is what is meant by "the politics of form." n66 **The idea is to** [\*1610] **examine the prevailing structures of thought** "on the bias," so to speak**, in an attempt to reveal the way in which** directionality, predilection, and **normative precommitment are always already embedded in form**. n67 As Jeremy Paul suggests**, it is by opening a space for reflection in this way that legal theory can have a progressive political payoff. n68 Through these examinations of form and its practical-political consequences, we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice**. n69 Sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn put the challenge gravely: "Life struggling against form, or through form to its will -- 'pity and terror --.' Law means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on law."

### AT: Perm

**Cooption DA – the perm forces us to down the path of bureaucratic tyranny, once we’ve been assimilated escape is impossible.**

**Delgado 93** (Richard, June 1993, Prof. of Law @ U. of Colorado, New York University Law Review, “Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle”)

**"Normative discourse is always self-centered**," Rodrigo replied. "The critique of normativity shows that in a number of ways. n81 For example, society may tolerate or even inaugurate new rights for women or minorities. But then it will invariably declare that your and my exercise of those rights is not what they had in mind at all. When a low-income Black woman has an abortion, that will seem like lasciviousness and hypersexuality, an irresponsible exercise of the right. n82 When a right to nondiscriminatory treatment in employment is recognized, everyone celebrates. But when a Black man with credentials short of Albert Einstein's gets a job, that will seem troublesome and unprincipled." n83 "So, the conclusion you draw from all this is ... ?" "That **one should never adopt the perspective of the more powerful group, even strategically**. Adopting another's perspective is always a mistake. One starts out thinking one can go along with the more numerous, better organized, and more influential group - say, white women in the case of sisters of color - and reap some benefits. **You think that you can jump nimbly aside before the inevitable setbacks, disappointments and double crosses set in. But you can't. You will march strongly and determinedly in the wrong direction, alienating yourself in the process**. You'll end up having the newly deployed rights cut back in your case, perhaps being criticized as irresponsible when you try to exercise them. Moreover, **any small suggestion for deviation in the agenda**, any polite request that the larger group consider your own concerns, **will bring quick denunciation**. You are being divisive. You are weakening the movement."

### AT: No Link

**This argument links them harder; the attempt to disconnect themselves from whether they think it passes is an impossible act that restructures their distance from emotions.**

**Schlag 98** (Pierre, Byron White Prof. Of Constitutional Law @ U. of Colorado, “The Enchantment of Reason” Duke University Press p. 108-110)

If this seems preposterous, consider that for those who make their lives “doing law,” it is very difficult not to inhabit this world. Indeed, for those engaged in “doing law,” how could they not believe in the metaphysics at least some of the time? For those who do the law, it is necessary, at the very least, to imagine what it feels like for doctrines to “bind” or rights to "trump." More than that, they must act, at least sometimes, as if doctrines do bind and rights do trump. **It would be a strange mind that could play** such **a role effectively while also remembering that it is just a role**. It would be like an actor who had to play Macbeth as authentically as possible, while also continuously recalling to himself that it is just a part. In fact, for the lawyer or the judge, the task is even more difficult than for the actor playing Macbeth. When Macbeth dies, the actor playing Macbeth nonetheless survives. When the lawyer loses his capital case and the judge pronounces a death sentence, the defendant will die. When the If consequences of role-playing have such serious implications, it becomes, of course, very difficult for the actors not to take comfort in metaphysics. One would, understandably, like to believe that the consequences that follow from "doing law" originate in some objective (stabilized) and subjective (authorized) reality greater than one's self-a reality that is redeemed in the way things are, rather than in shared socialconjectures about the way they might be. The legal academic, too, is likely to slip into legal metaphysics. **Legal academics** have slightly different reasons for lapsing into metaphysics: They **would like to believe that they are part of a true "discipline" and thus possessed of academic knowledge. It is this desire for a discipline that leads them to endow law with the structure, the continuity, the transcendence of metaphysics**. Without the metaphysics, the legal academics are just court watchers-journalists of Ca5e-Ww. With the metaphysics, by contrast, they are working on nothing less than The Law itself. But, whether a judge, a lawyer, or a law teacher, the sophisticated contemporary legal thinker cannot abide the supernatural metaphysics that would accord an objectivist form and subjective power to law or legal artifacts. It may be that the sophisticated contemporary legal thinker slips into metaphysical thinking. It may be that when one is "doing law" the doctrines really do seem to be there-there as real limits, real obstacles, real floors, real ceilings. It may be thatwhen the law "speaks" it has a binding effect. But while all this may be phenomenologically) true, **nonetheless the sophisticated contemporary legal thinker will deny believing in the supernatural metaphysic. Instead, the sophisticated contemporary legal thinker or actor will invoke "as if" jurisprudence by saying something like**: Yes-doctrines do bind, principles do justify, values do hold, and rights do trump. But ultimately: No-such notions are not to be taken literally. No intelligent person seriously believes (or has to be- lieve) that inert entities such as doctrines or principles do anything. That would be nonsense. Rather**, *these verbal formulations are figures of speech, a way of speaking, a series of metaphors. This way of speaking* *is a kind of "as if*"** jurisprudence. In other words, when doctrines are said to bind or rights to trump, this means only that the doctrines are to be understood as if they were binding and that rights are to be understood as if they trumped other claims***. It is just a way that legal actors and thinkers have of communicating*-or so goes the argument.** On the objectivist side, meanwhile, the response is: Yes, rules are objectively there, principles have objective content, and yes, it makes sense to talk about such things as "reach," "scope;' "weight," "elements" and so on. But, ultimately: No-such notions are not to be taken literally. No intelligent person seriously believes (or has to believe) that conceptual or linguistic phenomena such as doctrines or principles are real objects. That would be nonsense. Rather, these verbal formulations are figures of speech, a way of speaking, a series of metaphors. The "as if" responses are common among taday's sophisticated legal thinkers**. But these responses are ultimately dangerous to the enterprise that they are designed to safeguard.** The ambition of the sophisticated legal thinkers (and it is not a small one) is to avoid the naive metaphysics of objectivism and subjectivism while nonetheless retaining the frame and force of these metaphysics. This is akin to having one's cake and eating it too. The reason is simple. Let us concede, for the moment, that law is a kind of "as if" discourse. Let us concede that to speak of doctrines as binding or rights as trumping is a kind of metaphor. Again we run into the question: Metaphor for what? If the "bindingness" of doctrine does not come from the doctrine and if the "trumpiness" of rights does not come from the subjective power of rights, then where do they come from? Similarly, if the neutrality, impartiality, universality, stability of legal artifacts do not come from the objective character of law, then where do they come from? **The ambition of legal actors and thinkers is not just to avoid an untenable metaphysics** where doctrines are magically endowed with the innate power to bind and rights to trump (and so on). **Rather, the ambition is to jettison the supernatural metaphysic, while nonetheless retaining the frame and force of its key notions.**

### Steele

#### You should be an informed citizen, not the government – they shut down critical thinking and deliberation

Steele, 10 – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas

(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml) [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s **primary purpose** should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, we must **avoid a trap** into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “**Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do**.” This is **not a question** in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts **refused us**, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and **used for mechanisms of control**, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, **instead**, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who **plays the role** of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. What the President needs, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of **the brittleness of power**, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its **limits** and **pitfalls**; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to **listen to that voice** and **tremble**. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” **are missing the point**. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “**tell the story**” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “**tact**,” “**rules**,” and **seduction** that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and **no more can reasonably be asked**, for this planet to remain a place fit for human habitation” ([1964] 2006: 233).